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Resumen

Palabras clave
Leontief, función de
costos, biocombustibles,
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monopolística, precios
virtuales, etanol

La función de costos flexibles multiproducto de Leontief pretende una
aproximación a la tecnología utilizada por las refinerías y batidoras. En
general, esta función de costos satisface las restricciones de comportamiento racionales impuestas por la teoría económica. Los costos marginales
estimados se incorporan en un modelo de competencia monopolística,
para calcular los precios virtuales de los demás productos ofrecidos por las
refinerías y batidoras en la situación hipotética en la que la gasolina esté
ausente en los mercados de combustibles. Se ha encontrado que la gasolina convencional y otros precios de productos son mayores que en el caso
hipotético mencionado. Este resultado refleja el hecho de que los consumidores están asumiendo la sobrecarga de precios altos, con el fin de tener
un combustible disponible que se ajuste a las regulaciones de la Agencia
de Protección Ambiental (EPA). Por último, cuando todos los productos se
convierten en sustitutos perfectos, es decir, los consumidores no están interesados en la calidad de los combustibles, las diferencias de precios tienden
a ser insignificantes.

Uma análise da estrutura tecnológica de
refinarias e liquidificadores: cálculo da função
de custo de Leontief multiproduto e reserva
de preços
Resumo

Palavras chave
Leontief, função de
custos, biocombustíveis,
competência
monopolística, preços
virtuais, etanol

A função de custos flexíveis multiproduto de Leontief visa uma aproximação à tecnologia utilizada pelas refinarias e batedoras. Em geral, esta
função de custos satisfaz as restrições de comportamento racionais impostas pela teoria econômica. Os custos marginais estimados se incorporam
em um modelo de competência monopolística para calcular os preços virtuais dos rosou produtos oferecidos pelas refinarias e batedoras na situação
hipotética na que a gasolina esteja ausente nos mercados de combustíveis.
Chegou-se à conclusão de que a gasolina convencional e outros preços
de produtos são maiores que no caso hipotético mencionado. Este resultado reflete o fato de que os consumidores estão assumindo a sobrecarga
de preços altos, com o objetivo de ter um combustível disponível que se
ajuste às regulações da Agência de Proteção Ambiental (EPA). Por último,
quando todos os produtos se transformam em substitutos perfeitos, ou seja,
os consumidores não estão interessados na qualidade dos combustíveis, as
diferenças de preços tendem a ser insignificantes.

Equidad Desarro. N.º 23 • enero-junio del 2015

An Analysis of the Technological Structure of Refineries and Blenders

Introduction
Increases in petroleum prices have affected the prices of its derived products. In
addition, interest in issues related to the environment and energy security at a
world-wide level has increased. All of these factors have contributed to the development of alternative fuel such as ethanol, biodiesel, and natural gas.
In the United States, specifically, there are two major renewable fuels that
are being produced. Ethanol produced from grain, and biodiesel produced from
vegetable oils and animal fats.
The production of ethanol fuel is mainly based on corn, with a minor amount
of fuel ethanol produced from other feedstocks, including sorghum, cheese whey,
and beverage waste. On the other hand, the production of biodiesel is based on
different oils, including soybeans, canola, peanut, corn, cottonseed, and animal
fats such as tallow, yellow grease, and lard.
The demand for ethanol and biodiesel in the United States is mostly mandated by federal and state legislations. Legislation, such as the Clean Air Act
Amendments (CAAA) of 1990, the Energy Policy Act of 1992, and the Energy
Conservation Reauthorization Act of 1998 allowed the growth of the renewable
fuel industry during the 1990s. Recently, the Farm Security and Rural Investment
Act of 2002, the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, and the Energy Policy Act
of 2005 have strengthened the development of these biofuels.
In particular, ethanol has been used as fuel in the U.S. since 1908. Efforts to
sustain an U.S. ethanol program failed. Oil supply disruptions in the Middle East
and environmental concerns over the use of lead as a gasoline octane booster renewed interest in ethanol in the late 1970s. In general, the demand of ethanol is
determined by its two end uses, that is, as a conventional gasoline volume extender,
and as an oxygenate. In the past, methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) was the main
oxygenate utilized by refineries. Ethanol and MTBE were considered substitutes
for this end use, but MTBE is currently being phased out in some states due to
its drawbacks. Figure 1 depicts this situation. We can observe that the demand of
ethanol as a refinery input has risen noticeable in 2002, the year in which the state
of California announced a ban on the use of MTBE.
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Figure 1. Ethanol and MTBE as Refinery and Blenders Input
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The oxygen content requirement included in the federal and state policies and
regulations has opened a market for ethanol fuel. In fact, there are some blended
products derived from it such as reformulated gasoline,1 E10 (fuel composed of
10% of ethanol, 90% of gasoline), and E85 (fuel composed of 85% of ethanol, 15%
of gasoline). However, there exists skepticism to consider ethanol as a possible substitute for gasoline due to technical concerns like its low energy content. Figure 2
captures the price differences in terms of dollars per millions of BTU between
ethanol fuel and conventional gasoline. Notice that these gaps tend to disappear
in those periods related to high crude oil prices.

Reformulated gasoline must contain 2.0% of oxygen. Because of the ban on the use of MTBE,
ethanol might become the most common source to satisfy the oxygenate requirement imposed
on gasoline production. Notice that 10% ethanol blends contain about 3.5% oxygen in the fuel.
Therefore, the oxygen content requirement can be accomplished by using a 7.7% blend of ethanol
with conventional gasoline.

1
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Figure 2. Prices of Ethanol, Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline
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In order to obtain reformulated gasoline, conventional gasoline will only be
blended with ethanol because of the bans of MTBE. Currently, there are many
areas in which this process is observed. Thus, this study focuses on the effects
related to an increase in the competition associated with the inclusion of less polluted fuels, such as reformulated gasoline, among existing fuels. This is called the
price effect. If this new product very closely competes with existing products of
the same manufacturer, then the firm would consider to establish high prices for
its other products in the market. However, if the new product closely competes
with products of other manufacturers, then a decrease will likely be observed in
the prices of other products.
This paper also analyzes the structure of the technology used by refineries
and blenders. A multiproduct flexible cost function attempts to give an approach
to this technology. In general, this cost function satisfies the rational behavior
restrictions imposed by economic theory. Then the estimated marginal costs are
incorporated in a monopolistic competition model to calculate the virtual prices
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of conventional gasoline and other products provided by refineries and blenders in
the hypothetical situation in which reformulated gasoline is absent in fuel markets.
This study found that conventional gasoline and other product prices are greater
than those in the hypothetical case.
I have modified the cost function in a way that it has allowed us to capture
some features related to refineries and blenders. For instance, I have considered
the multiproduct characteristic of these plants. In addition, I have also allowed the
fact that there could be some factors of production that are not variable. In fact,
I have included fixed factors such as the fixed asset and energy of this industry.
This paper is organized as follows. The section “Literature review” contains a
review of works that study ethanol as a source to generate alternative fuels, and a
description of recent regulations imposed on refineries and blenders. This section
also includes a brief summary of some applied works related to the estimation of
cost functions in other industries. Sections “Consumer’s Problem” and “Data”
describe the main assumptions needed to specify the monopolistic competition
model used to calculate the virtual prices. The section entitled “Estimation on
the Leontief Cost Function” establishes the key assumptions to estimate the
multiproduct generalized Leontief cost function. “Estimation Results,” “Firm’s
Problem: Pricing Equations,” and “Simulation Results” correspond to methods,
procedures, data, and conclusions considered in this study.

Literature Review
Ethanol Literature
The production of ethanol could be based on a wide variety of available feedstocks. Indeed, U.S. ethanol fuel is mainly based on corn, but this fuel could
be produced from other feedstocks such as crops containing sugar: sugar beets,
sugarcane, and sweet sorghum. Moreover, food processing byproducts, such as
molasses, cheese whey, beverage waste, and cellulosic materials, including grass
and wood, as well as agricultural and forestry residues could be utilized in order
to process this biofuel. Almost all the U.S. ethanol production utilize corn for
its conversion process and a relatively small amount of ethanol is obtained from
sorghum, cheese whey and beverage waste (Shapouri et al., 2006). U.S. ethanol
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industry has processed 11% of the nation’s corn crop and consumed more than
11% of the nation’s grain sorghum.2
The two main processes used to produce ethanol are dry and wet milling.
In the dry-mill process, solids remaining after distillation are dried to produce
byproducts and are sold as an animal feed supplement. In the wet-mill process,
there are various byproducts such as corn oil, corn gluten feed, corn gluten meal,
and carbon dioxide.
The net feedstock costs are defined as the cost of the feedstocks per gallon of
ethanol after prices received for byproducts have been subtracted. The net feedstock cost is the most important variable cost which has ranged from 79 cents per
gallon of ethanol in 1981 to less than 10 cents per gallon of ethanol in 1987. For
the period 1981-1989, net feedstock costs for a wet mill process averaged $0.473
per gallon. For the period 1981-1989, net feedstock costs averaged $0.52 per gallon
for a dry mill process (Kane et al., 1989). For the period 2003-2005, net feedstock
costs for a wet mill process were calculated at about $0.40 per gallon with ethanol
production costs calculated at $1.03 per gallon. For the same period, net feedstock
costs for a dry mill process were calculated at about $0.53 per gallon with ethanol
production costs calculated at $1.05 per gallon (Shapouri et al., 2006).
Eidman (2006) discusses the features that different renewable liquid fuels such
as ethanol-gasoline and biodiesel-petroleum diesel blends have and their impacts
on the emission for transportation vehicles. The author also establishes the main
sources of demand for the liquid fuels analyzed in his work. He argues that there
are four segments that determine the demand for ethanol. Legislation through
various federal and state policies represents three of them. The Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990 imposed two major oxygenated requirements: 1) in 1992 it
was established that the gasoline sold in carbon monoxide non-attainment areas
must contain 2.7% oxygen, and 2) reformulated gasoline (RFG) was required to
contain 2% oxygen in the nine worst ozone non-attainment areas. On the other
hand, there are two components that constitute the third segment, which are
the Federal Excise Tax maintained since 1970 and the fact that some states have
mandated that all gasoline sold within the state limits must be blended with a
minimum percentage of ethanol. This exemption consists of US$ 0.51 per gallon

See Renewable Fuels Association, Homegrown for the Homeland. Ethanol Industry Outlook
2005.

2
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of ethanol blended. The fourth segment corresponds to the use of ethanol as an
octane enhancing demand to produce premium gasoline. Finally, ethanol can
also serve as a fuel extender. This new market for ethanol was motivated by recent
increases in petroleum and regular gasoline prices.
Notice that three of the four segments of the demand of ethanol are mandated.
This would question the competitiveness of ethanol as a liquid fuel substitute to
regular gasoline when the subsidies expire. There are two components that could
influence the competitiveness of ethanol: (i) the cost of producing ethanol which
relies mainly on corn price; and (ii) the cost of transporting ethanol.
Joseph DiPardo3 (2005) argues that the production of ethanol from corn is a
mature technology that is not likely to see significant reductions in production
costs. Alternatively, this author suggests that substantial cost reductions may be
possible if cellulose-based feedstocks are used instead of corn. This author also
sustains the idea that logistics are also an issue for ethanol use. This idea comes
from the fact that in order to supply the west coast market with ethanol production,
this has to be sent through the Panama Canal because it is not possible to send
ethanol by using pipelines because the moisture in pipelines and storage tanks is
absorbed by the ethanol, causing it to separate from gasoline. It should be noted
that the Panama Canal has not been a relevant transportation option; for example,
in 1998, 38% of ethanol was hauled by truck, 48% was shipped by rail, and 14%
was hauled by barge.4 The ability to produce ethanol from low-cost biomass will
be the key to making ethanol competitive with gasoline according to this author.
The main conclusion of DiPardo’s study is that with the subsidy due to expire
in 2010, it is not clear whether ethanol will continue to receive political support.
Thus, the future of ethanol may depend on whether it can compete with crude
oil on its own merits. The National Energy Modeling System (NEMS) was used
to analyze the potential for cellulose-based ethanol production assuming various
technological scenarios and the expiration of subsidies.
Brazil and U.S. ethanol industries5 amount approximately for more than 30%
on the world ethanol production each. I should mention that almost all the Brazilian ethanol production is based on sugarcane while the U. S. ethanol industry

3

See Energy Information Administration for details.

4

See Shapouri et al. (1998) for details.

5

See Renewable Fuels Association (2005).
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does not currently utilize this crop for ethanol conversion process. There exist
studies about the economic feasibility of U.S. ethanol production based on crops
containing sugar, such as sugarcane and sugar beets, but corn appears to be cost
competitive with regard to these other feedstocks. Molasses could be considered
relatively cost competitive with corn-based ethanol. Therefore, the challenge for
the ethanol industry relies on the implementation of biotechnology that could
modify grains to become better feedstocks for ethanol.

Literature on the Estimation of Cost Functions
With the objective to calculate the virtual prices, I have planned to establish an
econometric model that allows us to estimate the input-output demand functions
and the marginal costs.
I will refer to some relevant studies in which demand functions have been
estimated for other industries.
This research is mostly based on the analysis and techniques developed by
Diewert and Wales (1987) and Friendlaender and Spady (1980). Diewert and
Wales (1987) compare two of the traditional flexible functional forms, such as
the translog and the generalized Leontief cost functions, with two alternative approaches. They demonstrate that these four functions reached results that are
generally comparable in terms of price, output, and technological change effects.
Nevertheless, they prove that the symmetric generalized MacFadden and the
generalized Barnett cost functions satisfy the curvature restrictions implied by
microeconomic theory whereas the former cost functions fail.
Friendlaender and Spady (1980) estimated the demand function for freight
transportation by using the single output translog cost function in which freight
transportation is considered as a productive input of 96 three-digit manufacturing
industries and it was treated like other inputs. They took the first order condition of
the cost function and obtained the input demand equations by applying Shephard’s
lemma. I should mention that they estimated the short-run cost function because
they assumed that the analyzed firms are not always in long-run equilibrium.
Another application of single-output cost function estimation is the work done
by Rask (1995) in which the author estimated the one-product modified symmetric
McFadden cost function for Brazilian sugarcane in order to test for the presence
of technological change and economies of scales.
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On the other hand, there are many studies in which the single-output assumption has been relaxed. Kumbhakar (1994) estimated the multi-product symmetric
generalized McFadden cost function to test the technological progress, overall
returns to scale, product specific returns to scale and economies of scope on 12
Finnish foundry plants. Finally, Ivaldi and McCullough (2004) estimated the generalized McFadden cost function as an intermediate step to apply the subadditivity
test to the U.S. railroad industry to analyze the feasibility of separating the technology into an infrastructure component and operating component.
In this study I will estimate the input-output demand functions by using the
multi- product generalized Leontief cost function. I will basically follow the
procedure established by Friendlaender and Spady, but I will utilize the above
mentioned flexible functional form by assuming that the analyzed industry produces more than one product. Finally, I will allow the presence of quasi-fixed input
in the cost function specification.
I have chosen this functional form because it fits the data well among the other
functional forms in terms of the regularity condition and substitution elasticities.6
These two criteria are particularly important for my study because I am interested
that my estimations of demand functions satisfy the microeconomic conditions
imposed by the rational behavior of individuals and firms.

Consumer’s Problem
The theory on differentiated products has identified two approaches in deriving
discrete choice models. In the first approach, called the Non-Address Approach,
economy is represented by a single consumer whose preferences exhibit a taste
for consuming a variety of products. The second approach, called the Address
Approach, assumes that consumers have different tastes for different brands. In
the last approach, consumers buy at most one unit of the brand. The difference
between these two approaches relies on their assumptions.
In the first approach, the product variety is originated from the taste of variety
rather than the variety of consumer preferences related to the second approach.
I have decided to implement the first approach in this study because the micro

6

See Fisher, Fleissig and Serletis (2001) and Diewert and Wales (1987).
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level data of households is easily incorporated. I should emphasize that this is a
general equilibrium model. In other words, consumer’s demand is generated from
a utility maximization problem and firms, which are assumed to be modelled as
price-setting oligopolists, maximize their profits.
The U.S. liquid fuel market will be characterized by using a structural model
which attempts to capture some of the main features of this market. A large market
share of the total motor-fuel use in the U.S. fuel industry is destined to private and
commercial use evidencing that consumers play an important role in the analysis
of this sector. Gasoline is the dominant product in the U.S. fuel market. In fact,
gasoline and gasohol consumption in private and commercial use accounted for
74.3% of the total fuel consumption according to Highway Statistics (2005).
I will then assume that there is a representative consumer whose preferences
are represented by a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function, used
by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977):

Equation 1

Where 0 < ρ < 1 in order to guarantee concavity and zero values of yk which
represents the consumed amount of different fuels. The budget constraint is written as follows:

Equation 2

Where pk is the price of the different kind of fuels produced by refineries and
blenders. Notice that y0 is a numeraire good which implies that the income is in
terms of this numeraire.
Given the product prices {p1, ..., pk, ..., pK}, the list of quantities {y1, ..., yk, ..., yK}
is an equilibrium if yk solves the following problem:

Equation 3
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Equation 4
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Equation 5

Solving the consumer’s problem, I obtain the following demand equations:7

Equation 6

This CES utility function has similar properties to those of the “discrete choice”
model, such as logit and nested logit models, but differs from the discrete choice
model by assuming continuity of the quantities demanded of the discrete good.8
For instance, the discrete choice utility functions suffer from the problem of the
“independent of irrelevant alternatives” (IIA). In fact, the problem with the logit
model is that the calculated demand elasticities are independent from the prices or
characteristics of any third product, i.e. the independent of irrelevant alternatives
property, which will imply that the cross price elasticities of all goods with regard
to a third good are equal. The proposed CES function has the same characteristic with respect to the calculated cross price elasticities.9 Finally, Anderson et al.
(1989) showed that the logit and the CES models can be reconciled by imposing
some conditions in the characteristics space.10

7

See Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) for details.

Feenstra (2004) has proven that the discrete choice function tends to a CES function by sharing the same assumptions.

8
9

Notice that the own price elasticity is given by aaaaaaaaa. On the other hand, cross price elas-

ticities are given by aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa, where we can observe that these elasticities are symmetric.
10

For details, see Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1989).
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Estimation of the Leontief Cost Function
The vector of inputs, denoted as x
blender’s problem defined as:

{x1, x2, ..., xN}, , minimizes the refinery and

Equation 7

Where the minimization problem is subject to: i) the non-negativity constraint,
and ii) the technology of a refinery and blender that could be represented by a production function, denoted as fk (x; t), such that yk = fk {x1, x2, ..., xN; t} ∀K = 1, 2, ... K,
and yk is the maximal amount of the k-th output that can be produced by using
this input vector in period t. It is worth noting that I will assume a multiproduct
technology, that is, the refineries and blenders are allowed to produce more than
one output by using the same vector of inputs. Thus, the technology constraint is
written, in vector terms, as f (x; t) ≥ y.
According to microeconomic restrictions imposed by rational economic behavior, the cost function C (a) will satisfy two conditions: i) it will be linearly
homogenous in the input prices, and ii) it will be concave in the input prices. I
also assume that C (a) is a twice continuous differentiable function with respect
to all its arguments, such as prices, output, and technological progress variable
represented as t.
I will consider a specific functional form that will approximate the cost function, C (a), in order to estimate the input-output demand functions. I will analyze
their properties in terms of the regularity conditions and the precision of the estimations with respect to input-output price elasticities. The functional form that
I will apply, as was mentioned in the previous section, is the multiproduct symmetric generalized Leontief cost function.
Before I proceed with the analysis of the flexible cost functions, I will define
the cost model as follows:

Equation 8
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Where:
C

the conditional cost function with a fixed factor

wo

oil prices

we

ethanol prices

wM

MTBE prices

wng

natural gas prices

160

wI

wage index

yrf

amount produced of reformulated gasoline

ycv

amount produced of conventional gasoline

yoth

amount produced of other products

t

proxy variable for the state of technical knowledge at time t

A amount of fixed assets used by refineries and blenders
E amount of energy used by refineries and blenders
α, β, γ, π, ss parameters assumed to be exogenously given

Multiproduct Symmetric Generalized
Leontief cost function (MGL)
Consider the following functional form:
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With bij = bij∀i, j = 1, 2, ..., N. The cost function defined in (9) is linearly
(N + K)(N + K + 1)
homogenous in input prices W ≥ 0 and it has dsfjsgljsdjfsa
parameters which is
2
just the right number for equation (9) to be a flexible functional form. The 3N
number, αi , βi , and γi , are assumed to be exogenously given. In particular, I will
set all of these parameters to be equal to the average amount of input used over
the sample period. Notice that the letters i, j stand for the amount of inputs and
for the amount of outputs.
I will treat ethanol as another input used by refineries to produce different
products. The refineries utilized the following inputs: crude oil, natural gas and
some oxygenates, such as ethanol and MTBE, to produce aggregate outputs such
as reformulated gasoline (yrf), conventional gasoline (ycf), and others (yoth). I have
also included the fixed asset and energy inputs, (A) and (E), in our cost function
specification. These variables represent our quasi-fixed inputs which were defined
in this manner due to data limitation.
I assume that the input prices, wi ∀i = o, e, M, ng, l, and the outputs, yrf , ycv and
yoth , are exogenous. But I assume that the input quantities, xi ,∀i = o, e, M, ng, l,
and the total cost, C, are endogenous.
In order to get a mathematical expression for the input demand functions, I
apply the Shephard’s lemma which states that the cost-minimizing demand for
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input i can simply be derived by differentiating the cost function with respect to
wi . Therefore, the optimal factor demands are obtained by differentiating equation
(9) with respect to wi , yielding:

Equation 10

I then divide the equation (10) by the amount of the refinery and blender’s total
production, so the input-output demand functions are as follows:

Equation 11
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Where y = (∑k=1K dk yk )∀k = rf, cv, oth. As I mention there are six inputs: oil, ethanol, MTBE, energy, fixed assets, and labor. The three outputs, yrf , ycv and yoth , are
captured by the production of reformulated gasoline, conventional gasoline and
other products. The multi-product generalized Leontief cost-minimizing inputoutput equations are derived in the appendix.
I should remark that one disadvantage of using the MGL cost function is that
global concavity will be satisfied if I impose the restriction of non-negativity on
all the coefficients bij for i ≠ j, but this would rule out complementarity between all
pair of inputs.

Data
This analysis utilized the following variables: i) oil production, ii) ethanol production, iii) MTBE production, iv) reformulated gasoline production, v) conventional
gasoline production, vi) natural gas production, vii) fixed assets for petroleum and
coal products, viii) energy used by refineries and blenders, ix) number of worker
in the industry, x) oil price, xi) ethanol price, xii) M price, xiii) natural gas price,
and xiv) wage index. I should mention that most of these variables were obtained
through the Energy Information Administration (EIA) database which is available
on its website.11 It is worth noting that all of these variables were selected from the
refinery and blender viewpoint. The production of ethanol, oil, MTBE and natural gas represent the amount of these inputs used for refineries and blenders in
the U.S. in order to produce reformulated and conventional gasoline, and other
products as outputs.
All of these input and output productions are in terms of thousand barrels while
all of the price variables are in terms of dollars per barrels. The fixed assets variable
was obtained from the database of the Bureau of Economic Analysis.12 Finally,
the number of worker and the wage index were collected from the database of the
Bureau of Labor Statistics.13 Table 1 contains the basic descriptive statistics of the
database employed in this study.

11

The website of the Energy Information Administration is: www.eia.doe.gov.

12

The website of the Bureau of Economic Analysis is: www.bea.gov.

13

The website of the Bureau of Labor Statistics is: www.bls.gov.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for the Period 09/94-12/05
Input-Output

164

Oil

Variable

Units

Mean
value

St.
Deviation

Production

Millions of barrels

452.012

25.396

Price

Dollars per barrel

27.542

11.998

Ethanol

Production

Millions of barrels

2.411

2.184

Price

Dollars per barrel

1.272

0.249

MTBE

Production

Millions of barrels

6.465

1.619

Price

Dollars per barrel

0.917

0.240

12.887

2.2

3.464

1.917

130.151

10.327

142.992

14.196

Natural Gas

Labor

Production

Millions of barrels

Price

Dollars per thousand cubic feet

Number of Worker

Thousands

Wage index
Fixed Assets

Billions of dollars

61.4

4.694

Energy

Dollars per barrel

1.27

0.37

Millions of barrels

165.950

9.994

142.949

36.617

75.626

12.722

CV Gas

Production
Price

Cents per gallon

RF Gas

Production

Millions of barrels

Price

Cents per gallon

153.049

38.179

Others

Production

Millions of barrels

277.468

18.022

Price

Cents per gallon

91.424

38.718

Source: Own elaboration.

Estimation Results
The empirical section is focused on the estimation of the system of demand
functions derived from the MGL cost function. As such, I have allowed for no
constant returns to scale technology and no technological change assumptions in
our specification. In what follows, I describe what our main tasks for this present
study were.
I have tested for potential endogeneity problems whose results have certainly
determined the best econometric procedure to estimate those systems of equations
explained in previous sections. I did not find any evidence for the presence of
endogeneity in the MGL framework according to the Hausman test. Thus, the
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input-output demand functions were estimated by using the nonlinear iterative
Zellner’s seemingly unrelated regression (NLITSUR) procedure whose results
are reported in the table A.1. I have used NLITSUR because one would expect
disturbances across input-output equations to be contemporaneously correlated,
implying that the disturbance covariance matrix would be non-diagonal.

Economies of Scale and Economies of Scope
Table 2 contains the estimation of key parameters, such as the own and cross
price elasticities of input-output demands, the economies of scale and scope for
refineries and blenders.
Table 2. Economies of Scale and Scope
Equation
Demand

Input-Output

Mean value

St. Dev/St. Errors

-0.00933

0.00277

Ethanol

-145.706

0.4334

MTBE

-0.52942

0.1575

Ng

-0.38715

0.1152

Labor

-0.44416

0.1321

Overall Returns to scale

2.27

0.0578

PSRTS Conventional gas

2.66

0.3151

PSRTS Reformulated gas

2.84

0.1009

PSRTS Other products

2.02

0.0956

Economies of Scope

0.928

0.0419

Oil

Variable
Own price elasticity

Source: Own elaboration.

As it can be observed in Table 2, all own price elasticities indicate that these
inputs are price inelastic, in the sense that a small percentage variation in the price
will negligibly change the amount of input-output demand, except for ethanol
whose own price elasticity is greater than −1. In other words, ethanol is sensitive
to price variations compared to the rest of inputs. Notice that in Table 3 cross price
elasticities are suggesting that crude oil is a substitute input with regard to ethanol,
MTBE, and natural gas in the production process. According to our calculations,
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crude oil and labor seem to be complement, but I cannot fully rely on this result
because this cross price elasticity is not significant at any level.14 Thus, cross price
elasticities imply that the different types of materials are substitutes for crude oil.
166
Table 3. Own and Cross Price Elasticities (standard errors are reported in parenthesis)
Input-Output
Oil

Oil

Ethanol

MTBE

Ng

Labor

-0.00933

0.001984

0.00527

0.002113

-0.00005

(0.00277)

(0.00107)

(0.00167)

(0.00162)

(0.000095)

0.222531

-1.45706

-0.20098

0.081136

0.000425

(0.1200)

( 0.4334)

(0.0877)

(0.0760)

(0.00896)

MTBE

0.253337

-0.08598

-0.52942

-0.15701

0.003531

(0.0799)

(0.0375)

(0.1575)

(0.0455)

(0.00309)

Ng

0.104258

0.035687

-0.16142

-0.38715

-0.00365

(0.0800)

(0.0334)

(0.0467)

(0.1152)

(0.00280)

0.03167

0.002502

0.048621

-0.04892

-0.44416

Ethanol

Labor

Source: Own elaboration.

On the other hand, in Table 2, I have also reported the mean values of the
economies of scale and scope. In order to obtain those measurements of cost advantages, I have followed the approach done by Bailey and Friendlaender (1982).
These authors extended the traditional concepts of economies of scale and scope
by incorporating the multiproduct nature of the firms.
Economies of scale exists if the total cost increases less proportionally than
output. I utilized the following expression:

Equation 12

Where AC and MC denote the average and marginal costs, respectively. For
simplicity, I have omitted other arguments in the cost function except for the vector

14

See Table A.1 for additional details.
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of products represented by Y. Alternatively, the above expression is the reciprocal
of the elasticity of cost with regard to output.
If df1, then the firm exhibits increasing, constant, or decreasing returns to scale.
I have found evidence of economies of scale since S = 2.27 in average. I have also
calculated the product-specific returns to scales (PSRTSK) which have shown
evidence of economies of scale in all three products.15
The existence of positive economies of scope imply that a single firm can jointly
produce a given level of output of each product more cheaply than the total cost
of separate production at the given level of output. The economies of scope for
our specific case are given by:

Equation 13

If df0, then economies of scope exist or not. The estimates of ESC are positive
for all the years. The mean value of these estimates are reported in Table 1. The
presence of economies of scope is relevant in this industry since some of its inputs
are indivisible (e.g. some machineries) and they can be assigned to the production
process of more than one product.
The evidence of the presence of economies of scale and economies of scope
has a direct implication on the conjecture of natural monopoly in this industry.
It is well known that if an industry exhibits both product-specific economies of
scale and economies of scope at that level, then subadditivity will likely exist.
Subadditivity of the cost function simply implies that the production of all possible combinations of commodities could be accomplished at least cost by a single
multi-product firm in this case. Therefore, the analyzed industry satisfies the definition of natural monopoly that requires the subadditivity of the cost function
to be proven.

15

The product-specific return to scale is given by PSRTSK =
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Marginal Cost Estimations
168

The marginal costs16 for the three products are reported below. The average marginal cost for conventional gasoline is about $31.707 per barrel or equivalently
$0.755 per gallon, while reformulated gasoline is associated to an average marginal cost of $32.142 per barrel ($0.765 per gallon). Notice that the dispersion of
the regular gasoline marginal cost is greater than that of reformulated gasoline.
Table 4. Marginal Costs
Equation
Cost

Input-Output

Variable

Mean value

St. Dev/St. Errors

Conventional Gas

Marginal Cost ($/barrel)

31.707

12.009

Reformulated Gas

32.142

11.554

Other

49.514

17.066

Source: Own elaboration.

"The evidence of
the presence of
economies of scale
and economies of
scope has a direct
implication on
the conjecture of
natural monopoly
in this industry.
It is well known
that if an industry
exhibits both
product-specific
economies of scale
and economies of
scope at that level,
then subadditivity
will likely exist".

The difference of the estimated marginal costs
between conventional and reformulated gasoline
captures the fact that refiners had to include the
costs of meeting the standards of CAAA1990 which
mandated the production of reformulated gasoline
since 1995 with the inclusion of some stringent requirements afterwards. Estimated marginal costs are
presented in the appendix for the 1994-2005 period.
Prices paid by consumers at any gas station
reflect the cost of crude oil to refiners, refinery processing, marketing and distribution costs, and retail
station costs.17 Average petroleum price in 2004 was
$36.98 per barrel and represented 47% of the total
cost of a gallon of conventional gasoline. Moreover,

I have calculated the marginal costs of each products by multiplying the input price vector time the vector of second derivative
of the cost function with respect to the products.

16

See Energy Information Administration Brochures: A Primer
on Gasoline Prices.

17
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refining costs comprise about another 19% of the retail price of gasoline. Having
just taken into account the cost of crude oil and refinery processing, the margin
of conventional gasoline is, on average, $0.64 per gallon in 2004, while the estimated margin averages $0.60 per gallon in the same year. There was a difference
of four cents per gallon between the observed and the estimated margin in 2004.
In general, I believe that the estimated price-cost margins are coherent with the
observed data since the cost functional form appropriately reflects the technology
of refineries and blenders. Figure 3 reports the price-cost margins for conventional
and reformulated gasoline.
Figure 3. Estimated Price-Cost Margins

(US$/gallon)

1.2
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2

nov-04

nov-03

nov-02

nov-01

nov-00

nov-99

nov-98

nov-97

nov-96

nov-95

nov-94

0

years
Conventional gas

Reformulated gas

Source: Own elaboration.

Lerner Indices
The well-known measurement of the amount of monopoly power called the Lerner index is obtained by dividing the price-cost margins by price. This definition
of monopoly power is based on the firm’s ability to set price above marginal cost.
The Lerner index is defined as:
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Equation 14
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Where zxcxzcxcl and D(pm) denotes the demand elasticity at the monopoly
price, pm, and monopoly output, respectively. The left-hand side of the equation (14)
represents the Lerner index. It is worth mentioning that I have incorporated the
estimated short-run marginal cost into the above equation in order to estimate this
index. The Lerner index is inversely proportional to demand elasticity. Therefore,
if the index tends to zero, demand elasticity will approach to infinity. The Lerner
indices for reformulated and conventional gasoline on average for the period under
analysis are reported in Table 5.
Table 5. Lerner Indices
Year

Conventional Gas

1995

0.57

0.57

(0.04)

(0.03)

1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

Reformulated Gas

0.51

0.53

(0.05)

(0.06)

0.50

0.52

(0.06)

(0.06)

0.57

0.59

(0.04)

(0.04)

0.53

0.57

(0.05)

(0.05)

0.39

0.43

(0.14)

(0.06)

0.39

0.44

(0.14)

(0.13)

0.47

0.49

(0.03)

(0.03)

0.36

0.40

(0.08)

(0.07)

0.33

0.38

(0.04)

(0.04)

0.28

0.29

(0.25)

(0.28)

Source: Own elaboration.
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As observed in Table 5, the Lerner index for reformulated gasoline is higher
than that related to conventional gasoline in all the years. As it was previously
mentioned, greater indices imply lower values of demand elasticities. Therefore,
given that the multi-product natural monopoly hypothesis has not been excluded
for this industry, I examined what type of pricing rule is being implemented by
refiners and blenders. I found that this industry is a discriminating natural monopoly in its pricing scheme in 87.2% of the total observations. A discriminating
monopoly that sells a strictly positive amount in each market charges more in
markets with lower elasticity of demand. Finally, I verify that this price scheme is
also suggesting a subsidy-free pricing rule since the observations do not support
the cross-subsidization pricing evidence18 which could have been very attempting
to establish.

Firm’s Problem: Pricing Equations
This section will be based on the studies done by Hausman (1997) and Hausman
and Leonard (2002). Both studies provide the conceptual framework to analyze
the introduction of new products. In general, the introduction of a new product
is expected to benefit consumers because it will increase the variety in a market.
This is called the variety effect.
On the other hand, the introduction of a new
"The introduction
product increases the competition among the existof a new product
ing products. This is called the price effect. If this
new product very closely competes with existing
increases the
products of the same manufacturer, then the firm
competition
would consider to establish high prices for its other
among the existing
products in the market. However, if the new product
products. This is
closely competes with the products of other manucalled the price
facturers, then a decrease will likely be observed in
effect".
the prices of the other products.

Cross-subsidization is said to exist when the price of one product is set so as to generate additional revenues that are used to subsidize the production of another good supplied by a firm. No
observation satisfies the conditions under which the price of the low-cost product is too high and
the price of the high-cost product is too low.

18
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The results of these models depend strongly on the assumption related to the
market structure. I would assume any kind of market structure such as Bertrand,
Cournot, and even collusion.
The competitive effects associated to the introduction of a new product would
be quantified by implementing either a direct or an indirect approach. By using
the direct approach I need information pre and post the introduction of reformulated gasoline. In this study I rule out the direct approach due to data limitations.
The indirect approach allows us to calculate the price effect by using the current
information, i.e., the post introduction information.
In what follows, I will define the firm’s problem and obtain the first order necessary conditions in order to specify the price-margin equations for a multiproduct
monopolistic competition scheme.
The list of prices and quantities {p1, p2, ..., pK ; y1, y2, ..., yK } is a Bertrand-Nash
equilibrium if:
i) Given p1, ..., pK–1 , pK+1; pK solves the following problem:

Equation 15

ii) yk = D(p ); p1, p2, ..., pK ; y1, y2, ..., yK ≥ 0

Observe from equation (15) that I have assumed a multiproduct monopolistic
competition. Notice that I have kept the assumption of multiproduct nature of the
firms introduced in section 4 with the estimation of the cost function. On the other
hand, I have assumed a Bertrand market structure where firms set prices rather
than quantities. The Bertrand structure is more convenient given the fact that firms
are able to modify prices faster and at less cost than to change quantities due to
technological and capacity constraints related to them. The first order necessary
conditions of the above problem are as follows:19

19

See Tirole (1988) for details.
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Equation 16
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Finally, multiplying the equation (16) by sdasdasd, I have:

Equation 17

Where the first term, sk , represents the share of the kth fuel and the second
term of the equation (17) could be thought of as the price-cost markups multiplied
by cross price elasticities of different fuels. I have solved the mentioned system
of equations by calculating the price-cost markups. In order to solve that system,
I have incorporated my estimations of the marginal costs that were done in the
previous section.

Simulation Results
In this section, I try to calculate the indirect price effects of the reformulated
gasoline introduction. The reservation prices are defined as the prices for which
a refiner or blender is at break-even point and, therefore, indifferent between producing and not producing reformulated gasoline. The reservation o virtual price
for reformulated gasoline, with this utility function specification, is infinite. But
I still can approximate the price effects related to the introduction of a new good
in the fuel market.
I have incorporated the estimation of the marginal costs into the price-cost
margin equations in order to recover not only the Lerner indexes, but also the price
changes. I have solved the system of equations (17) and introduced the assumption that the demand for reformulated gasoline is set to zero by using the Newton
method, the results are reported in Tables 6 to 9. In those tables, I have reported
the values of the Lerner indexes and the prices under both scenarios, i.e. with the
presence of reformulated gasoline and simulating the absence of this fuel. Table 10
contains the percentage differences in both the Lerner Indexes and prices. These
percentage differences reflect the variation between the current situation, with
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reformulated gasoline in the fuel market, and the hypothetical scenario in terms
of the Lerner indexes and prices.
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Table 6. Lerner Indexes (with reformulated
gasoline in the market)
ρ
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9

Conventional
Gasoline

Table 7. Lerner Indexes (simulating the
absence of reformulated gasoline in the market)

Other
Products

ρ

0.902

0.916

0.1

(0.000256813)

(0.0066126)

0.8017

0.815

(0.000221175)

(0.0063278)

0.702

0.714

(0.000185759)

(0.0060585)

0.601

0.613

(0.000151074)

(0.0058068)

0.501

0.512

(0.000118426)

(0.0055692)

0.401

0.412

(0.000090942)

(0.0053191)

0.300

0.310

(0.000072930)

(0.0049415)

0.200

0.209

(0.000055790)

(0.0040459)

0.100

0.105

(0.000015653)

(0.0021187)

Source: Own elaboration.
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0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9

Conventional
Gasoline

Other
Products

0.901

0.911

(0.000107118)

(0.0046727)

0.801

0.810

(0.000094421)

(0.0044659)

0.701

0.710

(0.000081998)

(0.0042700)

0.601

0.609

(0.000070058)

(0.0040865)

0.500

0.508

(0.000058980)

(0.0039132)

0.4002966

0.4076936

(0.000049319)

(0.0037323)

0.300

0.307

(0.000041023)

(0.0034654)

0.200

0.206

(0.000029624)

(0.0028430)

0.100

0.104

(8.0006789x10 )
6

Source: Own elaboration.

(0.0014997)
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Table 8. Prices ($/gallons) (with reformulated gasoline in the market)
ρ

Conventional Gasoline

Other Products

0.1

7.746

13.885

0.2

3.830

6.345

0.3

2.544

4.116

0.4

1.905

3.046

0.5

1.522

2.418

0.6

1.267

2.004

0.7

1.086

1.712

0.8

0.950

1.493

0.9

0.844

1.321

Source: Own elaboration.

Table 9. Virtual Prices ($/gallons) (simulating the absence of reformulated gasoline in the market)
ρ

Conventional Gasoline

Other Products

0.1

7.66

13.118

0.2

3.812

6.195

0.3

2.537

40.568

0.4

1.902

30.160

0.5

1.521

2.400

0.6

1.267

1.994

0.7

1.085

1.704

0.8

0.950

1.488

0.9

0.844

1.319

Source: Own elaboration.
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Table 10. Lerner Indexes and Price Differences (in percentage changes)

176

ρ

Lerner Indexes
Conventional Gasoline

Other
Products

Prices
Conventional Gasoline

Other
Products

0.1

0.123

0.581

1.079

5.527

0.2

0.120

0.611

0.467

2.363

0.3

0.117

0.651

0.265

1.428

0.4

0.111

0.705

0.163

0.980

0.5

0.104

0.782

0.102

0.718

0.6

0.092

0.898

0.061

0.546

0.7

0.073

1.076

0.032

0.420

0.8

0.041

1.338

0.011

0.306

0.9

0.006

1.571

0.001

0.163

Source: Own elaboration.

I have calculated the percentage changes for the different values of ρ∈(0,1).
All the changes are positive; this implies that the Lerner indexes and prices in the
current situation are higher than those in the hypothetical scenario. Moreover,
notice that as ρ 1, these differences tend to decrease, except for the Lerner index
related to the other products. Recall, that when ρ 1, all products are perfect
substitutes and therefore diversity is not valued at all. Hence, as long as is close to
one, price differences become negligible for both conventional gasoline and the
other products produced by refineries and blenders.

Conclusions
The main goal of this study has been to estimate the virtual prices for conventional gasoline and other products provided by refineries and blenders in the
hypothetical situation in which reformulated gasoline is absent in fuel markets.
As an intermediate step, I estimated the marginal costs for the three products selected in this research by using a Leontief multiproduct cost function. In general,
this cost function satisfies the rational behavior restrictions imposed by economic
theory. The estimated marginal costs were then incorporated in the price-margin
system of equations. Solving this system of equations, I have found that conventional gasoline and other product prices are greater than those in the mentioned

Equidad Desarro. N.º 23 • enero-junio del 2015

An Analysis of the Technological Structure of Refineries and Blenders

hypothetical case. This result reflects the fact that consumers are being charged
with high prices in order to have available a fuel associated with improved quality properties established by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). On
the other hand, I should emphasize that when ρ = 1, all the products are perfect
substitutes, i.e. consumers are not interested in product diversity and thus in this
case they do not care about the quality of fuels. The calculated price differences,
reported in Table 10, confirm this intuition. I have noticed that as long as ρ 1
these price changes become positively negligible. Hence, if the parameter associated to the utility function of consumers tends to one, then consumers are less
willing to pay high prices for those clean fuels.
Another contribution of this paper has been the estimation of the demand
equation for ethanol as input in the production processes refineries and blenders.
The demand for ethanol can be forecasted by using the estimated parameters of
demand systems. Projections for the ethanol demand might be analyzed taking
into account federal and state tax schedules and some policy implications might
be established. Finally, this study could be extended to calculate the consumer’s
welfare effect under the same hypothetical scenario.
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Appendix 1. Input-output demand equations derived from the Leontief cost function

Equation 18

Equation 19
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Equation 20
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Equation 21

Equidad Desarro. N.º 23 • enero-junio del 2015

Juan Manuel Domínguez

Equation 22
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Appendix 2. Parameter Estimates for the Multiproduct Leontief Cost Function with QuasiFixed Inputs
Parameter
βoo

Oil

Ethanol

MTBE

2.534.782
(0.6757)

βeo

-0.00032
(0.000558)

βmo

0.001744
(0.000688)

βngo

0.00183
(0.000704)

βee

-0.1776
(0.2189)

βme

-0.00161
(0.00147)

βnge

0.00346
(0.00169)

βle

0.000478
(0.00271)

βmm

0.471181
(0.3682)
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Ng

Labor
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Parameter

Oil

Ethanol

MTBE

βnn

Ng

Labor

1.516.189
(0.6163)

βll

-586.297
-45.109

βngm

-0.00685
(0.00264)

βlm

0.002747
(0.00233)

βlng

-0.00508
(0.00316)

βorf

2,45E-03
(0.000019)

βocv

-0.00002
(0.000017)

βooth

-5.06E-6
(0.000011)

βorfcv

-2.46E-6
(0.000015)

βorfoth

-3.63E-6
(0.000014)

βocvoth

8,15E-03
(0.000014)

βerf

0.000269
(0.000125)

βecv

0.000373
(0.000121)

βeoth

0.000254
(0.000079)

βerfcv

0.000338
(0.000106)

βerfoth

-0.00027
(0.000095)

βecvoth

-0.0003
(0.000096)

Continue

Equidad Desarro. N.º 23 • enero-junio del 2015

183

Juan Manuel Domínguez

Parameter

Oil

Ethanol

βmrf

MTBE

Ng

Labor

-0.00023
(0.000109)

184

βmcv

-0.00016
(0.000105)

βmoth

-0.00016
(0.000069)

βmrfcv

-0.00025
(0.000092)

βmrfoth

0.000213
(0.000083)

βmcvoth

0.000151
(0.000083)

βngrf

0.000156
(0.000127)

βngcv

0.000412
(0.000121)

βngoth

0.00024
(0.000080)

βngrfcv

0.000294
(0.000107)

βngrfoth

-0.00025
(0.000096)

βngcvoth

-0.00034
(0.000097)

βlrf

0.000029
(0.000063)

βlcv

-0.00003
(0.000061)

βloth

-6.34E-6
(0.000040)

βlrfcv

0,005846
(0.000054)

βlrfoth

-4.09E-6
(0.000048)
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Parameter

Oil

Ethanol

MTBE

Ng

βlcvoth

Labor
0.000026
(0.000049)

βo

-99.1027

185

(84.8319)
βe

0.916421
(3.8071)

βm

-7.86205
(8.7473)

βn

-49.2241
(19.9982)

βl

Parameter
ao

167.2847

Oil

Ethanol

MTBE

Ng

Labor
(104.7)

0.000011
(6.875E-6)

ae

2.316E-6
(2.092E-7)

am

-2.73E-6
(4.867E-7)

ang

1.18E-6
(1.137E-6)

al

-6.86E-6
(5.734E-6)

eo

2.22E-14
(1.69E-14)

ee

-508E-18
(4.33E-16)

em

5.18E-16
(1.01E-15)

eng

5.75E-16
(2.36E-15)

el

-779E-17
(1.25E-14)

Demand
Equation

Adj R2

Durbin
Watson

Continue
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Parameter

Ethanol

0.3685

1.97

DETHANOL

0.9835

1.31

DM

0.8657

1.92

DNG

0.7923

1.15

DL

0.8246

2.78

MTBE

Ng

Labor

Source: Own elaboration.

Appendix 3. Marginal Costs
2.5

(US$/gallon)

2

1.5

1

0.5

years
Conventional gas

Source: Own elaboration.
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Reformulated gas

Reformulated gas

sep-04

sep-03

sep-02

sep-01

sep-00

sep-99

sep-98

sep-97

sep-96

sep-95

0
sep-94
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Oil

DOIL

